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1. Introduction
This article relates economies and traders’ knowledge. We consider a pure exchange
atomless economy under uncertainty where the traders are assumed to have a non-
partitional information structure. The purpose is to propose the extended notion of
rational expectations equilibrium for the economy, and we investigate the relation-
ship between the ex-post core and the rational expectations equilibrium allocations
with emphasis on epistemic point of view. It is shown that
Main Theorem (Core equivalence theorem). In a pure exchange atomless econ-
omy under generalized information, assume that the traders have a reﬂexive infor-
mation structure and they are risk averse. Then the ex-post core coincides with the
set of all rational expectations equilibrium allocations for the economy.
Many authors have investigated several notions of core in an economy under
asymmetric information (e.g., Wilson (1978), Volij (2000), Einy et al (2000) and
others). The serious limitations of the analysis in these researches are its use of
the ‘partition’ structure by which the traders receive information. The structure is
obtained if each trader t’s possibility operator Pt : Ω → 2Ω assigning to each state
ω in a state space Ω the information set Pt(ω) that t possesses in ω is reﬂexive,
  Partially supported by the Grant-in-Aid for Scientiﬁc Research(C)(2)(No.14540145) in
the Japan Society for the Promotion of Sciences.
1transitive and symmetric. From the epistemic point of view, this entails t’s knowl-
edge operator Kt :2 Ω → 2Ω that satisﬁes ‘Truth’ axiom T: Kt(E)  E (what is
known is true), the ‘positive introspection’ axiom 4: Kt(E)  Kt(Kt(E)) (we know
what we do) and the ‘negative introspection’ axiom 5: Ω \Kt(E)  Kt(Ω \Kt(E))
(we know what we do not know).
One of these requirements, symmetry (or the equivalent axiom 5), is indeed so
strong that describes the hyper-rationality of traders, and thus it is particularly
objectionable. The recent idea of ‘bounded rationality’ suggests dropping such as-
sumption since real people are not complete reasoners. In this article we weaken both
transitivity and symmetry imposing only reﬂexivity. As has already been pointed
out in the literature, this relaxation can potentially yield important results in a
world with imperfectly Bayesian agents (e.g. Geanakoplos, 1989).
The idea has been performed in diﬀerent settings. Among other things Geanako-
plos (1989) showed the no speculation theorem in the extended rational expectations
equilibrium under the assumption that the information structure is reﬂexive, tran-
sitive and nested (Corollary 3.2 in Geanakoplos [1989]). The condition ‘nestedness’
is interpreted as a requisite on the ‘memory’ of the trader.
Recently, Matsuhisa and Ishikawa (2002) introduced the notion ‘rationality about
expectations’ with respect to a price system p. This is that each trader who learns
from the price knows his/her expected utility. They showed the existence theorem
of generalized rational expectations equilibrium for an economy under reﬂexive and
transitive information structure; in particular, the existence of the equilibria under
the further assumption that all trader are rational everywhere about expectations.
This article is in the line of Geanakoplos (1989) and Matsuhisa and Ishikawa (2002).
We shall relax transitivity in an economy under generalized information structure,
and we extend the ex-post core equivalence theorem of Einy et al (2000) into an
economy under reﬂexive information structure with removing out transitivity and
symmetry.
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an illustration of Main the-
orem by a simple example of an economy under non-nested reﬂexive information
structure. In Section 3 we present our model: An economy under reﬂexive informa-
tion structure, a generalized notion of rational expectations equilibrium and ex-post
core for the economy. Section 4 gives the existence theorem of rational expectations
equilibrium. In Section 5 we give the proof of Main theorem. Section 6 presents the
fundamental theorem of welfare economics in an economy under reﬂexive informa-
tion structure. In section 6 we extend No speculation theorem in an economy under
reﬂexive information structure. This is a generalization of Corollary 3.2 in Geanako-
plos (1989). Finally we conclude by giving some remarks about the assumptions of
the theorem.
2. Illustrative example
Let us consider the following situation: Two traders 1 and 2 are willing to buy and
sell the tradeable emissions permits with each other. Trader 1 is interested in the
global warming problem, but trader 2 is not at all. There is one commodity, and
only unused allowances are transferable between two traders 1 and 2.
2We shall illustrate the situation as follows: Let Ω be the state space consisting of
the three states {ω1,ω 2,ω 3}: The state ω1 represents that the temperature is higher
than the normal one, the state ω2 represents that it is the normal temperature and
ﬁnally the state ω3 represents that the temperature is lower than the normal one.
Trader 1 is sensitive to the environmental change that the temperature becomes
higher or lower, and so she can know which of either ω1, ω2 or ω3 is the true state
when each of them occurs. Hence trader 1 has her information structure P1(ω)=
{ω} for any ω ∈ Ω.
Trader 2 is less sensitive than trader 1. He is ignorant of the environmental
change, and so he cannot know which is a true state among ω1,ω 2 and ω3 when ω2
occurs. When the temperature becomes higher or lower he cannot understand it, so
he cannot know which of either ω2 or ω3 is a true state when ω3 occurs, and he cannot
know which of either ω1 or ω2 is a true state when ω1 occurs. Hence trader 2 has
his information structure P2(ω1)={ω1,ω 2}, P2(ω2)=Ω and P2(ω3)={ω2,ω 3}.
Suppose that traders 1 and 2 have the initial endowments e1(ω)=e2(ω) = 1 ton
for every ω ∈ Ω and they have the risk averse utilities: U1(x,ω)=U2(x,ω)=
√
x +4
for every ω ∈ Ω. Their common prior π is given by π(ω)=3
7 for ω = ω1,ω 3 and
π(ω2)=1
7.
Then it can be plainly observed that the traders’ initial endowments allocation
is
– ex-ante Pareto optimal,
– the unique rational expectations equilibrium allocation (Corollary 1), and
– ex-post core allocation. (Main theorem)
It should be noted that P2 satisﬁes the reﬂexivity: For any ω ∈ Ω, ω ∈ P2(ω),
however it does not satisfy the transitivity: P2(ξ)  P2(ω) whenever ξ ∈ P2(ω).
Moreover P2 is not nested.1
In this article we shall investigate the pure exchange economies under generalized
information structure as like this example.
3. The Model
Let Ω be a non-empty ﬁnite set called a state space, and let 2Ω denote the ﬁeld of
all subsets of Ω. Each member of 2Ω is called an event and each element of Ω a
state. The space of the traders is a measurable space (T,Σ,µ) in which T is a set
of traders, Σ is a σ-ﬁeld of subsets of T whose elements are called coalitions, and µ
is a measure on Σ.
3.1. Information and Knowledge2
An information structure (Pt)t∈T is a class of mappings Pt of Ω into 2Ω. It is said
to be reﬂexive if
Ref ω ∈ Pt(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω,
and it is said to be transitive if
1 An information structure (Pi)i∈N is said to be nested if for each i ∈ N and for all states
ω and ξ in Ω, either Pi(ω) ∩ Pi(ξ)=∅, or else Pi(ω)
j Pi(ξ)o rPi(ω)
k Pi(ξ).
2 See Bacharach (1985), Binmore (1992).
3Trn ξ ∈ Pt(ω) implies Pt(ξ)  Pt(ω) for any ξ,ω ∈ Ω.
An information structure (Pi)i∈N is called an RT-information structure if it is re-
ﬂexive and transitive.3
Given our interpretation, a trader t for whom Pt(ω)  E knows, in the state ω,
that some state in the event E has occurred. In this case we say that at the state
ω the trader t knows E. i’s knowledge operator Kt on 2Ω is deﬁned by Kt(E)=
{ω ∈ Ω|Pt(ω)  E}. The set Pt(ω) will be interpreted as the set of all the states
of nature that t knows to be possible at ω, and KtE will be interpreted as the set
of states of nature for which t knows E to be possible. We will therefore call Pt t’s
possibility operator on Ω and also will call Pt(ω) t’s possibility set at ω. A possibility
operator Pt is determined by the knowledge operator Kt such as Pt(ω)=

KtE ω E.
However it is also noted that the operator Pt cannot be uniquely determined by the
knowledge operator Kt when Pt does not satisfy the both conditions Ref and Trn.
A partitional information structure is an RT-information structure (Pt)t∈T with
the additional condition: For each t ∈ T and every ω ∈ Ω,
Sym ξ ∈ Pt(ω) implies Pt(ξ)   ω .
3.2. Economy under reﬂexive information structure
A pure exchange economy under uncertainty is a tuple  T,Σ,µ,Ω,e,(Ut)t∈T,(πt)t∈T 
consisting of the following structure and interpretations: There are l commodities
in each state of the state space Ω , and it is assumed that Ω is ﬁnite and that the
consumption set of trader t is Rl
+;
– (T,Σ,µ) is the measure space of the traders;
– e : T × Ω → Rl
+ is t’s initial endowment such that e(·,ω)i sµ-measurable for
each ω ∈ Ω;
– Ut : Rl
+ × Ω → R is t’s von-Neumann and Morgenstern utility function;
– πt is a subjective prior on Ω for a trader t ∈ T.
For simplicity it is assumed that (Ω,πt) is a ﬁnite probability space with πt full
support4for almost all t ∈ T.
Deﬁnition 1. An economy under reﬂexive information structure EK is a structure
 E,(Pt)t∈T , in which E is a pure exchange economy under uncertainty with a state-
space Ω ﬁnite and (Pt)t∈T a reﬂexive information structure on Ω. Furthermore it
is called an economy under RT-information structure if (Pt)t∈T is a reﬂexive and
transitive information structure.
Remark 1. An economy under asymmetric information is an economy EK under
partitional information structure (i.e., (Pt)t∈T satisﬁes the three conditions Ref,
Trn and Sym.)
Let EK be an economy under reﬂexive information structure. We denote by Ft
the ﬁeld generated by {Pt(ω) | ω ∈ Ω} and by F the join of all Ft(t ∈ T); i.e.
F = ∨t∈TFt. We denote by {A(ω) | ω ∈ Ω } the set of all atoms A(ω) containing
ω of the ﬁeld F = ∨t∈TFt.
3 An RT-information structure stands for a reﬂexive and transitive information structure.
4 I.e., πt(ω)
￿ 0 for every ω ∈ Ω.
4Remark 2. The set of atoms {At(ω) | ω ∈ Ω} of Ft does not necessarily coincide
with the partition induced from Pt.
We shall often refer to the following conditions: For every t ∈ T,
A-1 For every ω ∈ Ω,

T e(t,ω)dµ   0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
A-2 e(t,·)i sFt-measurable
A-3 For each x ∈ Rl
+, the function Ut(x,·)i sFt-measurable, and the function:
T ×Rl
+ → R,(t,x)  → Ut(x,ω)i sΣ ×B-measurable where B is the σ-ﬁeld of all
Borel subsets of Rl
+.
A-4 For each ω ∈ Ω, the function Ut(·,ω) is continuous, strictly increasing on
Rl
+.
A-5 For each ω ∈ Ω, the function Ut(·,ω) is continuous, increasing, strictly
quasi-concave and non-saturated5on Rl
+.
Remark 3. It is plainly observed that A-5 implies A-4. We note also that A-3
does not mean that trader t knows his/her utility function Ut(·,ω).6
3.3. Ex-post core
An assignment x is a mapping from T ×Ω into Rl
+ such that for every ω ∈ Ω, the
function x(·,ω)i sµ-measurable, and for each t ∈ T, the function x(t,·) is at most
F-measurable. We denote by Ass(EK) the set of all assignments for the economy
EK.







We denote by Alc(EK) the set of all allocations, and for each t ∈ T we denote by
Alc(EK)t the set of all the functions a(t,·) for a ∈A lc(EK).
An assignment y is called an ex-post improvement of a coalition S ∈ Σ on an
assignment x at a state ω ∈ Ω if






Imp3 Ut(y(t,ω),ω)   Ut(x(t,ω),ω) for almost all t ∈ S.
We shall present the notion of core in an economy under reﬂexive information
structure EK.
Deﬁnition 2. An allocation x is said to be an ex-post core allocation of an economy
under reﬂexive information structure EK if there is no coalition having an ex-post
improvement on x at any state ω ∈ Ω. The ex-post core denoted by CExP(EK)i s
the set of all the ex-post core allocations of EK.
Let EK be the economy under reﬂexive information structure and EK(ω) the
economy with complete information  T,Σ,µ,e(·,ω),(Ut(·,ω))t∈T  for each ω ∈ Ω.
We denote by C(EK(ω)) the set of all core allocations for EK(ω).
5 I.e.; For any x ∈
R
l




+ such that Ut(x
 ,ω)
￿ Ut(x,ω).
6 That is, ω/ ∈ Kt([Ut(·,ω)]) for some ω ∈ Ω, where [Ut(·,ω)] := { ξ ∈ Ω | Ut(·,ξ)=
Ut(·,ω)}. This is because the information structure is not a partitional structure.
5Proposition 1. Let EK be a pure exchange economy under reﬂexive information
structure satisfying the conditions A-1, A-2 and A-3. Suppose that the economy
is atomless (that is, (T,Σ,µ) is non-atomic measurable space.) The ex-post core of
EK is non-empty (i.e., CExP(EK)  = ∅). Moreover, CExP(EK) coincides with the set
of all assignments x such that x(·,ω) is a core allocation for the economy EK(ω)
for all ω ∈ Ω: i.e.,
CExP(EK)={x ∈A lc(EK) | x(·,ω)) ∈C (EK(ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω}.
Proof. Is given by the same way of the proof in Theorem 3.1 in Einy et al (2000).
We shall give it in Appendix for readers’ convenience.
3.4. Expectation and Pareto optimality
Let EK be the economy under reﬂexive information structure. We denote by Et[Ut(x(t,·)]











Deﬁnition 3. An allocation x in an economy EK is said to be ex-ante Pareto-
optimal if there is no allocation a with the two properties as follows:
PO-1 For almost all t ∈ T,
Et[Ut(a(t,·)]  Et[Ut(x(t,·)].
PO-2 The set of all the traders s ∈ T such that
Es[Us(a(t,·)]   Es[Us(x(t,·)].
is not a µ-null set.
3.5. Rational expectations equilibrium
Let EK =  N,Ω,(et)t∈T,(Ut)t∈T,(πt)t∈T,(Pt)t∈T  be an economy under reﬂexive
information structure. A price system is a non-zero F-measurable function p : Ω →
Rl
+. We denote by σ(p) the smallest σ-ﬁeld that p is measurable, and by ∆(p)(ω)
the atom containing ω of the ﬁeld σ(p). The budget set of a trader t at a state ω
for a price system p is deﬁned by
Bt(ω,p): ={ x ∈ R
l
+ | p(ω) · x  p(ω) · e(t,ω) }.
Let ∆(p) ∩ Pt : Ω → 2Ω be deﬁned by (∆(p) ∩ Pt)(ω): =∆(p)(ω) ∩ Pt(ω); it is
plainly observed that the mapping ∆(p)∩ Pt satisﬁes Ref. We denote by σ(p)∨F t
the smallest σ-ﬁeld containing both the ﬁelds σ(p) and Ft, and by At(p)(ω) the
atom containing ω. It is noted that
At(p)(ω)=( ∆(p) ∩ At)(ω).
6Remark 4. If Pt satisﬁes Ref and Trn then σ(p) ∨F t coincides with the ﬁeld
generated by ∆(p) ∩ Pt.
We shall give the extended notion of rational expectations equilibrium for an
economy EK.
Deﬁnition 4. A rational expectations equilibrium for an economy EK under reﬂex-
ive information structure is a pair (p,x), in which p is a price system and x is an
allocation satisfying the following conditions:
RE 1 For every t ∈ T, x(t,·)i sσ(p) ∨F t-measurable.
RE 2 For almost all t ∈ T and for every ω ∈ Ω, x(t,ω) ∈ Bt(ω,p).
RE 3 For almost all t ∈ T,i fy(t,·):Ω → Rl
+ is σ(p) ∨F t-measurable with
y(t,ω) ∈ Bt(ω,p) for all ω ∈ Ω, then
Et[Ut(x(t,·))|∆(p) ∩ Pt](ω)  Et[Ut(y(t,·))|∆(p) ∩ Pt](ω)
pointwise on Ω.





The allocation x in EK is called a rational expectations equilibrium allocation.
We denote by RE(EK) the set of all the rational expectations equilibria of an
economy under reﬂexive information structure EK, and denote by R(EK) the set of
all the rational expectations equilibrium allocations for the economy
4. Existence theorem
We shall prove the existence theorem of the generalized rational expectations equi-
librium for an economy under reﬂexive information structure EK. Let EK(ω) be the
economy with complete information for each ω ∈ Ω. We set by W(EK(ω)) the set
of all the competitive equilibria for EK(ω), and we denote by W(EK(ω)) the set of
all the competitive equilibrium allocations for EK(ω).
Theorem 1. Let EK be a pure exchange economy under reﬂexive information struc-
ture satisfying the conditions A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4. Suppose that the economy
is atomless (that is, (T,Σ,µ) is non-atomic measurable space.) Then there exists a
rational expectations equilibrium for the economy; i.e., R(EK)  = ∅.
Proof. In view of the conditions A-1,A-2, A-3 and A-4, it follows from the exis-
tence theorem of a competitive equilibrium for an atomless economy with complete
information (c.f.: Theorem 9 in Debreu (1982)) that for each ω ∈ Ω, there exists
a competitive equilibrium (p∗(ω),x∗(·,ω)) ∈ W(EK(ω)). We take a sequence of
strictly positive numbers {kω}ω∈Ω such that kωp∗(ω)  = kξp∗(ξ) for any ω  = ξ.W e
deﬁne the pair (p,x) as follows: For each ω ∈ Ω and for all ξ ∈ A(ω), p(ξ): =kωp∗(ω)
and x(t,ξ): =x∗(t,ω). It is noted that x(·,ξ) ∈ W(EK(ω)) because EK(ξ)=EK(ω),
and we note that ∆(p)(ω)=A(ω).
We shall verify that (p,x) is a rational expectations equilibrium for EK: In fact,
it is easily seen that p is F-measurable with ∆(p)(ω)=A(ω) and that x(t,·)i s
σ(p) ∨F t-measurable, so RE 1 is valid. Because (∆(p) ∩ Pt)(ω)=A(ω) for every
7ω ∈ Ω, it can be plainly observed that x(t,·) satisﬁes RE 2, and it follows from
A-3 that for almost all t ∈ T,
Et[Ut(x(t,·))|∆(p) ∩ Pt](ω)=Ut(x(t,ω),ω) (1)
On noting that EK(ξ)=EK(ω) for any ξ ∈ A(ω), it is plainly observed that
(p(ω),x(t,ω)) = (kωp∗(ω),x∗(t,ω)) is also a competitive equilibrium for EK(ω) for
every ω ∈ Ω, and it can be observed by Eq (1) that RE 3 is valid for (p,x), in
completing the proof.    
Remark 5. Matsuhisa and Ishikawa (2002) shows Theorem 1 for an economy under
RT-information structure.
5. Proof of Main theorem
We can now state explicitly Main theorem in Section 1 as follows:
Theorem 2. Let EK be a pure exchange economy under reﬂexive information struc-
ture satisfying the conditions A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4. Suppose that the economy
is atomless (that is, (T,Σ,µ) is non-atomic measurable space.) Then the ex-post
core coincides with the set of all rational expectations equilibrium allocations; i.e.,
CExP(EK)=R(EK).
In view of Theorem 1 it is ﬁrst noted that R(EK)  = ∅. Because EK(ω)i sa n
atomless economy for each ω ∈ Ω, it follows from the core equivalence theorem of
Aumann (1964) that C(EK(ω)) = W(EK(ω)) for any ω ∈ Ω. We shall observe that
Main theorem immediately follows from the above Proposition 1 together with the
below Proposition 2:
Proposition 2. Let EK be an economy under reﬂexive information structure sat-
isfying the conditions A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4. Then the set of all rational expec-
tations equilibrium allocations R(EK) coincides with the set of all the assignments
x such that x(·,ω) is a competitive equilibrium allocation for the economy with
complete information EK(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω; i.e.,
R(EK)={x ∈A lc(EK) | There is a price system p such that
(p(ω),x(·,ω)) ∈ W(EK(ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω}.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Let x ∈R (EK). By Proposition 2 we obtain that for each ω ∈ Ω,( p(ω),x(·,ω)) ∈
W(EK(ω)), and thus it follows from the theorem of Aumann (1964) that x(·,ω)) ∈
C(EK(ω)) for any ω ∈ Ω. By Propositions 1 it has been veriﬁed that CExP(EK) 
R(EK).
The converse shall be shown as follows: Let x ∈C ExP(EK). It follows from
Proposition 2 that for every ω ∈ Ω, x(·,ω) ∈C (EK(ω)). By the theorem of Au-
mann (1964) there is p∗(ω) ∈ Rl
+ such that (p∗(ω),x(·,ω)) ∈ W(EK(ω)). We take
a sequence of strictly positive numbers {kω}ω∈Ω such that kωp∗(ω)  = kξp∗(ξ) for
any ω  = ξ. We deﬁne the prime system p as follows: For each ω ∈ Ω and for all
ξ ∈ A(ω), p(ξ): =kωp∗(ω). Because EK(ξ)=EK(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω and for all
ξ ∈ A(ω), it can be observed that for every ω ∈ Ω,( p(ω),x(·,ω)) ∈ W(EK(ω)). By
Proposition 2, we have observed that CExP(EK)  R(EK).    
8Proof of Proposition 2
Let x ∈R (EK) and (p,x) a rational expectations equilibrium for EK. We shall
show that (p(ω),x(·,ω)) ∈ W(EK(ω)) for any ω ∈ Ω.
Suppose to the contrary that there exist a state ω0 ∈ Ω and non-null set S 
T with the property: For each s ∈ S there is an a(s,ω0) ∈ Bs(ω0,p) such that




a(t,ω0) for ξ ∈ At(p)(ω0) and t ∈ S;
x(t,ξ) otherwise.
It is easily observed that y(t,·)i sσ(p) ∨F t-measurable for every t ∈ T. On noting
that EK(ξ)=EK(ω) for any ξ ∈ At(p)(ω), it immediately follows that Bt(ξ,p)=
Bt(ω,p) for every ξ ∈ At(p)(ω), so y(t,ω) ∈ Bt(ω,p) for almost all t ∈ T and any
ω ∈ Ω. Therefore it can be obtained that for all s ∈ S,
Es[Us(x(s,·))|∆(p) ∩ Ps](ω0)   Es[Us(y(s,·))|∆(p) ∩ Ps](ω0),
in contradiction for (p,x) ∈R (EK).
The converse will be shown as follows: Let x be an assignment with (p(ω),x(·,ω)) ∈
W(EK(ω)) for any ω ∈ Ω. We take a sequence of strictly positive numbers {kω}ω∈Ω
such that kωp(ω)  = kξp(ξ) for any ω  = ξ. We deﬁne the price system p∗ : Ω → Rl
+
such that for each ω ∈ Ω and for all ξ ∈ A(ω), p∗(ξ): =kωp(ω). We shall show
that (p∗,x) ∈ RE(EK): In fact, it is ﬁrst noted that ∆(p∗)(ω)=A(ω) and that
(p∗(ξ),x(·,ξ)) ∈ W(EK(ω)) for every ξ ∈ A(p∗)(ω) because EK(ξ)=EK(ω). There-
fore x(t,·)i sσ(p) ∨F t-measurable for every t ∈ T, and x(t,ω) ∈ Bt(ω,p∗) for
almost all t ∈ T. Let y(t,·):Ω → Rl
+ be a σ(p∗) ∨F t-measurable function with
y(t,ω) ∈ Bt(ω,p∗) for all ω ∈ Ω. In viewing that (∆(p∗) ∩ Pt)(ω)=A(ω) it can be




Since (p∗(ω),x(·,ω)) ∈ W(EK(ω)) it can be observed that Ut(x(t,ω),ω)  Ut(y(t,ω),ω)
for almost all t ∈ T and for each ω ∈ Ω, from which it follows from A-3 that
Et[Ut(x(t,·))|∆(p∗) ∩ Pt](ω)  Et[Ut(y(t,·))|∆(p∗) ∩ Pt](ω).
Therefore (p∗,x) ∈ RE(EK) and x ∈R (EK), in completing the proof.    
6. Fundamental theorem for welfare economics
We shall characterize welfare under the generalized rational expectations equilib-
rium for an economy under reﬂexive information structure EK.
Theorem 3. Let EK be an economy under reﬂexive information structure satisfy-
ing the conditions A-1,A-2, A-3 and A-5. An allocation is ex-ante Pareto optimal
if and only if it is a rational expectations equilibrium allocation relative to some
price system.
9Proof. Follows immediately from Propositions 3 and 4 below.    
Proposition 3. Let EK be an economy under reﬂexive information structure sat-
isfying the conditions A-1,A-2, A-3 and A-5. If an allocation x is ex-ante Pareto
optimal then it is a rational expectations equilibrium allocation relative to some price
system.
Proof. Is given by the same way in the proof of Proposition 4 in Matsuhisa and
Ishikawa (2002). We shall give it in Appendix for readers’ convenience.    
Proposition 4. Let EK be an economy under reﬂexive information structure sat-
isfying the conditions A-1,A-2, A-3 and A-5. Then an allocation x is ex-ante
Pareto optimal if it is a rational expectations equilibrium allocation relative to a
price system.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 2 that (p(ω),x(·,ω)) is a competitive equilibrium
for the economy with complete information EK(ω) at each ω ∈ Ω. Therefore in
viewing the fundamental theorem of welfare in the economy EK(ω), we can plainly
observe that for all ω ∈ Ω, x(·,ω) is Pareto optimal in EK(ω), and thus x is ex-ante
Pareto optimal.    
7. No speculation theorem
The following corollary is a generalization of Corollary 3.2 in Geanakoplos (1989).
An economy is not assumed to be atomless.
Corollary 1. Let EK be an economy under reﬂexive information structure satisfy-
ing the conditions A-1,A-2, A-3 and A-5. Suppose that the initial endowment e
is ex-ante Pareto optimal in EK.I f(p,x) is a rational expectations equilibrium in
EK for some price system p then x = e.
Proof. Let (p,x) ∈ RE(EK). It follows from Proposition 4 that x is ex-ante Pareto
optimal in EK. Suppose to the contrary that x  = e. Since e is ex-ante Pareto optimal
in EK it can be observed that there exist a non-null set S ⊆ T and s ∈ S such that
Es[Us(e(s,·))]   Es[Us(x(s,·))]. Therefore, on noting that µ is full support it can
be plainly veriﬁed that for some ω0 ∈ Ω, Us(e(s,ω0),ω 0)   Us(x(s,ω0),ω 0). On
the other hand, it follows from Proposition 2 that (p(ω0),x(·,ω 0)) ∈ W(EK(ω0)),
and thus Us(x(s,ω0),ω 0)  Us(e(s,ω0),ω 0), in contradiction.    
8. Concluding remarks
We shall give a remark about the ancillary assumptions in results in this article.
Could we prove the theorems under the generalized information structure removing
out the reﬂexivity? The answer is no vein. If trader t’s possibility operator does not
satisfy Ref then his/her expectation with respect to a price cannot be deﬁned at a
state because it is possible that ∆(p)(ω) ∩ Pt(ω)=∅ for some state ω.
Could we prove the theorems without four conditions A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4
together with A-5. The answer is no again. The suppression of any of these as-
sumptions renders the existence theorem of rational expectations equilibrium (The-
orem 1) vulnerable to the discussion and the example proposed in Remarks 4.6 of
Matsuhisa and Ishikawa (2002).
10Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
First we shall show the ﬁrst half part of the proposition that CExP(EK)  = ∅:I n
fact, it is noted that for every ω ∈ Ω, C(EK(ω))  = ∅.7 Take (xt(ω))t∈T ∈C (EK(ω))
for each ω ∈ Ω. Let x : T × Ω → Rl
+ be the the mapping deﬁned by x(t,ω)=
xt(ω). Viewing the assumptions A-2 and A-3 we can observe that for each ω ∈ Ω,
EK(ξ)=EK(ω) for all ξ ∈ A(ω), from which it immediately follows that x is an
assignment for EK. It can be plainly observed that x ∈C ExP(EK) as required.
Secondly we shall prove the last half part of the proposition. It can be plainly
observed that x ∈C ExP(EK) for each assignment x ∈A ss(EK) with x(·,ω) ∈
C(EK(ω)). The converse will be shown as follows. Suppose to the contrary that
there exists a core x for CExP(EK), and there is a state ω0 ∈ Ω such that x(·,ω 0) / ∈
C(EK(ω0)). Then there is a coalition S ∈ Σ with µ(S)   0 and there is a µ-





S e(t,ω0)dµ and Us(y(s),ω 0)  
Us(x(t,ω0),ω 0) for almost all s ∈ S. We set by z the assignment for EK deﬁned by
z(t,ξ): =

y(t)i f ξ ∈ A(ω0),
e(t,ξ) if not.
It is easily seen that z is an ex-post improvement of S on x at ω0 in contradiction.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
For each ω ∈ Ω we denote by G(ω) the set of all the vectors

T x(t,ω)dµ − 
T y(t,ω)dµ with an assignment y : T × Ω → Rl
+ such that Ut(y(t,ω),ω) 







y(t,ω)dµ ∈ Rl | y ∈A ss(EK) and
Ut(y(t,ω),ω)  Ut(x(t,ω),ω) for almost all t ∈ T}.
First, we note that that G(ω) is convex and closed in Rl
+ by the conditions A-1,
A-2, A-3 and A-5. It can be shown that
Claim 1: For each ω ∈ Ω there exists p∗(ω) ∈ Rl
+ such that p∗(ω) · v  0 for all
v ∈ G(ω).
Proof of Claim 1: By the separation theorem,8 we can plainly observe that the
assertion immediately follows from that v  0 for all v ∈ G(ω): Suppose to the
contrary that there exist ω0 ∈ Ω and v0 ∈ G(ω0) with v0   0. Take an assignment
y0 for EK such that for almost all t, Ut(y0(t,ω),ω 0)  Ut(x(t,ω0),ω 0) and v0 = 
T x(t,ω0)dµ −





µ(T) if ξ ∈ A(ω0),
x(t,ξ) if not.
7 C.f. Aumann (1964).
8 See Lemma 8, Chapter 4 in Arrow and Hahn (1971, pp.92.)



















Ut(x(t,ξ),ξ)πt(ξ) because of A-4
 Et[Ut(x)].
This is in contradiction to which x is ex-ante Pareto optimal as required.
Secondly, let p be the price system deﬁned as follows: We take a sequence of
strictly positive numbers {kω}ω∈Ω such that kωp∗(ω)  = kξp∗(ξ) for any ω  = ξ.
We deﬁne the price system p such that for each ω ∈ Ω and for all ξ ∈ A(ω),
p(ξ): =kωp∗(ω). It can be observed that ∆(p)(ω)=A(ω). To conclude the proof
we shall show
Claim 2: The pair (p,x) is a rational expectations equilibrium for EK.
Proof of Claim 2: We ﬁrst note that for every t ∈ T and for every ω ∈ Ω,
(∆(p) ∩ Pt)(ω)=∆(p)(ω)=A(ω),
Therefore it follows from A-3 that for every allocation x,
Et[Ut(x(t,·))|(∆(p) ∩ Pt)](ω)=Ut(x(t,ω),ω) (2)
To prove Claim 2 it suﬃces to verify that x satisﬁes RE 3. Suppose to the contrary
that there exists a non-null set S ∈ Σ with the two properties:
1. For almost all s ∈ S, there is a σ(p) ∨F s-measurable function y(s,·):Ω → Rl
+
such that y(s,ω) ∈ Bs(ω,p) for all ω ∈ Ω;
2. Es[Us(y(s,·))|(∆(p)∩Ps)](ω0)   Es[Us(x(s,·)|(∆(p)∩Ps)](ω0) for some ω0 ∈ Ω.
In view of Eq (2) it immediately follows from Property 2 that Us(y(s,ω0),ω 0)  
Us(x(s,ω0),ω 0), and thus y(s,ω0)   x(s,ω0)b yA-5. Therefore we obtain that for
all s ∈ S, p(ω0) · y(s,ω0)   p(ω0) · x(s,ω0), in contradiction. This completes the
proof.    
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